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Abstract
In this paper the question is addressed to what extent the collective processes in a multi-agent society
can be interpreted as single agent processes. This question is answered by formal analysis and
simulation. It is shown for an example process how it can be conceptualised, formalised and simulated
in two different manners: from a single agent (or cognitive) and from a multi-agent (or social)
perspective. Moreover, it is shown how an ontological mapping can be formally defined between the
two formalisations, and how this mapping can be extended to a mapping of dynamic properties. Thus it
is shown how collective behaviour can be interpreted in a formal manner as single agent behaviour.
Keywords:
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 Introduction
1.1
Many processes in the world can be conceptualised using an agent metaphor. The result of such a
conceptualisation is either a single agent (or cognitive) description or a multi-agent (or social) description.
Especially for processes that are distributed, it is natural to describe them as a group of interacting
agents. If a group of agents acts in a coherent way, however, one is often tempted to intuitively and
informally interpret the process in singular form as a collective, and, in fact, as one individual
(super)agent. The question addressed in this paper is whether in certain cases such an informal
interpretation of a multi-agent system, acting in a collective manner, as an individual can be supported
by a formal analysis. The approach to address this question is by formally defining an interpretation
mapping between a conceptualisation of a process as a multi-agent system and a conceptualisation of
the same process as an individual.
1.2
The prerequisites to undertake such a formal analysis concern formalisations of the notion of agent,
single agent behaviour and multi-agent behaviour, and the notion of interpretation mapping. More
specifically, what is needed is a formal notion of what an agent is in the sense of
distinctions between the agent's internal mental processes, the agent's body, and the agent's
environment
interactions and relationships between mental aspects and body aspects
interactions and relationships between agent and environment, including interactions with other
agents
Furthermore, formalisations of single agent behaviour and multi-agent behaviour are needed that
cover
the externally observable behaviour
the underlying internal processes
Moreover, a formal notion of interpretation mapping of a single agent conceptualisation into a multi-
agent conceptualisation is needed that
maps ontological concepts describing a conceptualisation of a process from an individual
perspective to ontological concepts describing a conceptualisation of the same a process from a
multi-agent perspective
covers mapping of individual mental state properties for the single agent conceptualisation to
shared mental state properties for the multi-agent conceptualisation
covers the mapping of dynamic aspects of single agent behaviour onto those of multi-agent
behaviour
In this paper, for these three notions formalisations are provided and used to indeed achieve an
approach of how a collective can be formally interpreted as an individual.
1.3
The formal interpretation approach is evaluated for the case of collective behaviour of an ant colony.
The intelligence shown by ant colonies are an interesting and currently often studied example of
collective intelligence (Bonabeau et al. 1999;Deneubourg et al. 1986;Drogoul et al. 1995). In this case,
by using pheromones, the external world is exploited as a form of extended mind; cf. (Clark 1997;Clark
and Chalmers 1998;Dennett 1996;Kirsh and Maglio 1994;Menary 2006). It is shown (in Section 7) how
this case can be seen as a paradigmatic case, also covering cases in human society. For example, cases
in which an organization or department wants to interact with 'one face' with the outside world, and to
this end maintains a repository for common guidelines. The analysis of this case study comprises on
the one hand a multi-agent model, simulation based on identified local dynamic properties, and
identification of dynamic properties for the overall process. On the other hand the same is done for an
alternative model based on a single agent with internal mental states, and the two models are related to
each other via the interpretation mapping.
1.4
In Section 2, a formalisation of basic agent concepts is introduced. Section 3 explains, using a simple
example, the idea of the basic formal ontology mapping between state properties in a single agent
conceptualisation and state properties in a multi-agent conceptualisation. In Section 4 this notion of
basic interpretation mapping of state properties is applied to two conceptualisations of the more
complex ant colony example, the central case study in the paper. Section 5 discusses the dynamics for
the two conceptualisations of the ant colony example in more detail, which leads to formal specification
of executable local dynamic properties that have been used for simulation. In Section 6 the basic
interpretation mapping for state properties is extended to dynamic properties, thus obtaining an
interpretation mapping between the two conceptualisations of the dynamics of the example ant colony
process. In Section 7 it is shown how the interpretation approach can be applied to other types of
societies (e.g., human societies), where patterns occur that are similar to those in the ants case. Section
8 is a final discussion.
Basic Agent Concepts
2.1
The agent perspective entails a distinction between the following different types of ontologies:
an ontology for internal mental properties of the agent A (MentOnt(A)),
for properties of the agent's (physical) body (BodyOnt(A)),
for properties of the (sensory or communication) input (InOnt(A))
for properties of the (action or communication) output (OutOnt(A)) of the agent, and
for properties of the external world (ExtOnt(A)).
For example, the property 'the agent A feels pain' may belong to MentOnt(A), resp. BodyOnt(A),
whereas 'it is raining' and 'the outside temperature is 7° C' may belong to ExtOnt(A). The agent input
ontology InOnt defines state properties for received perception or communication, as an in-between
step from environment or body state properties to internal mental state properties, the agent output
ontology OutOnt defines state properties that indicate initiations of actions or communications of the
agent, as an in-between step from internal mental state properties to environment or body state
properties. The combination of InOnt and OutOnt is the agent interaction ontology, defined by
InteractionOnt = InOnt ? OutOnt.
2.2
To formalise state property descriptions of the types introduced above, ontologies are specified in a
(many-sorted) first order logical format: an ontology is specified as a finite set of sorts, constants
within these sorts, and relations and functions over these sorts. The example properties mentioned
above then can be defined by nullary predicates (or proposition symbols) such as itsraining, or by
using n-ary predicates (with n≥1) like has_pain(A) and has_temperature(environment, 7).
2.3
For a given ontology Ont, the propositional language signature consisting of all state ground atoms
based on Ont is denoted by APROP(Ont). The state properties based on a certain ontology Ont are
formalised by the propositions that can be made, using (using conjunction, negation, disjunction,
implication) from the ground atoms. The notion of state as used here is characterised on the basis of
an ontology defining a set of physical and/or mental (state) properties that do or do not hold at a
certain point in time. In other words, a state S is an indication of which atomic state properties are true
and which are false, i.e., a mapping S: APROP(Ont)→ {true, false}.
2.4
To describe the internal and externally observable dynamics of the agent, explicit reference is made to
time. Dynamics will be described as evolution of states over time. Dynamic properties can be
formulated that relate a state at one point in time to a state at another point in time. A simple example
is the following informally stated dynamic property for belief creation based on observation:
'if the agent observes at t1 that it is raining, then the agent will believe that it is raining'.
To express such dynamic properties, and other, more sophisticated ones, the sorted predicate logic
Temporal Trace Language (TTL) is used (Jonker et al. 2003). Here, a trace over an ontology Ont is a time-
indexed sequence of states over Ont. TTL is built on atoms referring to, e.g., traces, time and state
properties. For example, 'in trace γ at time t property p holds' is formalised by state(γ, t) |= p. Here
|= is a predicate symbol in the language, usually used in infix notation, which is comparable to the
Holds-predicate in situation calculus. Dynamic properties are expressed by temporal statements built
using the usual logical connectives and quantification (for example, over traces, time and state
properties). For example, the dynamic property put forward above can be expressed in a more
structured semiformal manner as:
'in any trace γ, if at any point in time t1 the agent A observes that it is raining, then there
exists a time point t2 after t1 such that at t2 in the trace the agent A believes that it is
raining'.
In formalised TTL form it looks as follows:
?γ ?t1 [ state(γ, t1) |= observes(A, itsraining) ? ?t2 ≥ t1 state(γ, t2) |= belief(A,
itsraining) ]
2.5
Based on TTL, a simpler temporal language has been defined to specify simulation models. This
language (the leads to language) enables modelling direct temporal dependencies between two state
properties in successive states. This executable format is defined as follows. Let α and β be state
properties of the form 'conjunction of atoms or negations of atoms', and e, f, g, h non-negative real
numbers. In the leads to language α → e, f, g, h β, means:
If
state property α holds for a certain time interval with duration g,
then
after some delay (between e and f) state property β will hold for a certain time interval
of length h.
For a precise definition of the leads to format in terms of the language TTL, see Jonker et al. (2003). A
specification of dynamic properties in leads to format has as advantages that it is executable and that it
can often easily be depicted graphically.
 The Basic Interpretation Mapping
3.1
In this section it is discussed how a conceptualisation based on a single agent and individual (internal)
mental state properties can formally be mapped onto a conceptualisation based on multiple agents and
shared (for the sake of simplicity assumed external) mental state properties. Here this ontological
mapping is only given in its basic form, for the state properties. In Section 6 the basic mapping is
extended to temporal expressions describing behaviour.
3.2
First, consider Figure 1. This figure depicts a simple case of a single agent A with behaviour based on
an individual internal mental state property m1. The solid arrows depict temporal leads to relationships.
Mental state property m1 (temporally) depends on observations of three world state properties c1, c2,
c3. Moreover, action a1 depends on m1.
Figure 1. Single Agent behaviour based on an internal mental state
3.3
Now consider Figure 2. This figure depicts a group of agents A1, A2, A3, A4 with behaviour based on a
physical external world state property m2 that serves as a shared external mental state property.
Figure 2. Multi-Agent behaviour based on a shared external mental state
To create this shared mental state property, actions a2a, a2b, a2c of the agents A1, A2, A3 are needed,
and to show the behaviour, first an observation of m2 by agent A4 is needed. Note that here the internal
processing is chosen as simple as possible: stimulus response. Hence, this agent is assumed not to
have any internal states. This is in line with the ideas of Clark and Chalmers, who claim that the
explanation of cognitive processes should be as simple as possible (Clark and Chalmers 1998).
However, the interaction between agent and external world is a bit more complex: compared to a single
agent perspective with internal mental state m1, extra actions of some of the agents needed to create
the external mental state property m2, and additional observations are needed to observe it.
3.4
To make the similarity between the two different cognitive processes more precise, the following
mapping from the nodes (state properties) in Figure 1 onto nodes in Figure 2 can be made (see Figure
3):
External world state properties
φ: c1 → c1
φ: c2 → c2
φ: c3 → c3
φ: effect e1 → effect e1
Observation state properties
φ: A observes c1 → A1 observes c1
φ: A observes c2 → A2 observes c2
φ: A observes c3 → A3 observes c3
Action initiation state properties
φ: A initiates action a1 → A4 initiates action b1
Mental state property to external world state property
φ: m1 → m2
Figure 3. Mapping from individual mental state to shared extended mind
Note that in this case, for simplicity it is assumed that each observation of A is an observation of
exactly one of the Ai, and the same for actions.
3.5
This mapping φ, indicated by the vertical dotted arrows in Figure 3, preserves the temporal
dependencies in the form of leads to relationships (the solid arrows) and provides an isomorphic
embedding (in the mathematical sense) of a cognitive process based on internal mind into a cognitive
process based on extended mind.
3.6
In their paper about extended mind, Clark and Chalmers (1998) point at the similarity between
cognitive processes in the head and some processes involving the external world. This similarity can be
used as an indication that these processes can be considered extended cognitive processes or extended
mind:
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in
the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then
that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. Cognitive processes ain't
(all) in the head! (…) (Clark and Chalmers 1998, Section 2).
One can explain my choice of words in Scrabble, for example, as the outcome of an
extended cognitive process involving the rearrangement of tiles on my tray. Of course, one
could always try to explain my action in terms of internal processes and a long series of
"inputs" and "actions", but this explanation would be needlessly complex. If an isomorphic
process were going on in the head, we would feel no urge to characterize it in this
cumbersome way. (…) In a very real sense, the re-arrangement of tiles on the tray is not
part of action; it is part of thought. (Clark and Chalmers 1998, Section 3).
Clark and Chalmers (1998) use the isomorphic relation to a process 'in the head' as one of the criteria
to consider external and interaction processes as cognitive, or mind processes. As the shared mental
state property m2 is modelled as an external state property, this principle is formalised in Figure 3. Note
that the process from m1 to action a1, modelled as one step in the single agent, internal case, is
mapped onto a process from m2 via A4 observes m2 to A4 initiates action b1, modelled as a two-
step process in the multi-agent, external case. So the mapping is an isomorphic embedding in one
direction, not a bidirectional isomorphism, simply because on the multi-agent side, the observation
state for A4 observing m2 has no counterpart in the single agent, internal case (and the same for the
agents A1, A2, A3 initiating actions a2a, a2b, a2c).
3.7
Notice that the mapping φ is a (formal) mapping between state properties. However, it was already put
forward that temporal leads to relations are preserved under φ, so the mapping can be extended to a
mapping of leads to properties onto leads to properties. From a more general perspective, it can be
analysed how far the mapping φ can be extended to a (formal) mapping from dynamic properties to
dynamic properties expressed in TTL. This will be addressed in detail in Section 6.
 Two Conceptualisations and their Mapping
4.1
The general formalisation perspective put forward in previous sections has been evaluated for a case
study: a process of collective ant behaviour. For this example process, two conceptualisations have
been made, one from a multi-agent (or social) perspective, and one for a single agent (or cognitive)
perspective. In Section 7 it is shown how this case can be seen as a paradigmatic case for a large class
of cases, including cases in human society (for example, where an organization or department wants to
behave with 'one face' to the external world by maintaining common guidelines).
4.2
The world in which the ants live is described by a labeled graph as depicted in Figure 4. Locations are
indicated by A, B,…, and edges by E1, E2,… To represent such a graph the predicate
connected_to_via(l0,l1,e1) is used. The ants move from location to location via edges; while
passing an edge, pheromones are dropped. The same or other ants sense these pheromones and follow
the route in the direction of the strongest concentration. Pheromones evaporate over time; therefore
such routes can vary over time. The goal of the ants is to find food and bring this back to their nest. In
this example there is only one nest (location A) and one food source (location F).
Figure 4. An ant world
Multi-Agent Conceptualisation
4.3
The example process conceptualised from a multi-agent perspective concerns multiple agents (the
ants), each of which has input (to observe) and output (for moving and dropping pheromones) states,
and a physical body which is at certain positions over time. However, following the claims in the
previous section, they do not have any internal mental state properties (they are assumed to act purely
by stimulus-response behaviour). Note that the reason for leaving out internal states is not that it is
impossible, but simply that they are not needed for our purposes here. However, as will be discussed in
Section 7, the interpretation approach is applicable to agents with internal states as well. An overview
of the formalisation of the state properties of the multi-agent conceptualisation is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Multi-Agent conceptualisation: state properties
Multi-Agent Conceptualisation
body positions in world:
pheromone level at edge e is i pheromones_at(e, i)
ant a is at location l coming from e is_at_location_from(a, l, e)
ant a is at edge e to l2 coming from location l1 is_at_edge_from_to(a, e, l1, l2)
ant a is carrying food is_carrying_food(a)
world state properties:
edge e connects location l1 and l2 connected_to_via(l1, l2, e)
location l has i neighbours neighbours(l, i)
edge e is most attractive for ant a coming from
location l
attractive_direction_at(a, l, e)
input state properties:
ant a observes that it is at location l coming from edge
e
observes(a, is_at_location_from(l, e))
ant a observes that it is at edge e to l2 coming from
location l1
observes(a, is_at_edge_from_to(e, l1,
l2))
ant a observes that edge e has pheromone level i observes(a, pheromones_at(e, i))
output state properties:
ant a initiates action to go to edge e to l2 coming from
location l1
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e,
l1, l2))
ant a initiates action to go to location l coming from
edge e
to_be_performed(a,
go_to_location_from(l, e))
ant a initiates action to drop pheromones at edge e
coming from location l
to_be_performed(a,
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l))
ant a initiates action to pick up food to_be_performed(a, pick_up_food)
ant a initiates action to drop food to_be_performed(a, drop_food)
Single-Agent Conceptualisation
4.4
The conceptualisation of the example process from a single agent perspective (Superant S), however,
takes into account one body, of which each ant is part (for convenience we call them the 'paws' of this
body). Also the pheromone levels at the edges are part of the body.
Table 2: Single Agent conceptualisation: state properties
Single Agent Conceptualisation
mental state properties:
belief(S, relevance_level(e, i)) belief on the relevance level i of an edge e
body position in world:
has_paw_at_location_from(S, p, l, e) position of paw p at location l coming from edge
e
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(S, p, e, l1, l2) position of paw p at edge e to l2 coming from
location l1
is_carrying_food_with_paw(S, p) paw p is carrying food
world state properties:
connected_to_via(l1, l2, e) edge e connects location l1 and l2
neighbours(l, i) location l has i neighbours
attractive_direction_at(p, l, e) edge e is most attractive for paw p coming from
location l
input state properties:
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, l,
e))
S observes that paw p is at location l coming
from edge e
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p, e, l1,
l2))
S observes that paw p is at edge e to l2 coming
from location l1
output state properties:
to_be_performed(S,
move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e, l1, l2))
S initiates action to move paw p from location l1
to edge e to l2
to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_location_from
(p, l, e))
S initiates action to move paw p from edge e to
location l
to_be_performed(S, pick_up_food_with_paw(p)) S initiates action to pick up food with paw p
to_be_performed(S, drop_food_with_paw(p)) S initiates action to drop food with paw p
The body position of this agent in the world is defined by the collection of positions of each of the
paws. Mental state properties for this single agent occur in the form of beliefs that a certain edge has a
certain relevance level (realised in the body by the pheromone levels). Input of the single agent is
defined by the collection of inputs of the ants at each of the paws. Output is defined by initiation of
movements of one or more of the paws. Notice that in this case dropping pheromones is not an action,
but an internal body process to create or update the proper beliefs by creating or updating their
realisation in the body. An overview of the formalisation of the state properties of the multi-agent
conceptualisation is shown in Table 2. Note that there S stands for the Superant.
Mapping between Conceptualisations
4.5
The two conceptualisations described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 are two conceptualisations of one and the
same example process. A concept in any of the two conceptualisations in principle has a one-to-one
correspondence to an aspect of this example process which can be considered the informal semantics
of the concept (in our case the concept is formalised); see the double arrows in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Two conceptualisations and their mapping.
Given these one-to-one correspondences, a mapping from the single agent conceptualisation to the
multi-agent conceptualisation can be made as follows:
. 1 Take any state property c belonging to the single agent conceptualisation
. 2 Identify to what aspect a of the example process this state property corresponds
. 3 Identify to which state property d in the multi-agent conceptualisation this aspect a corresponds
. 4 Map c to d.
If this approach works, then a mapping is obtained that is faithful with respect to the example process:
the state property d to which c is mapped corresponds to the same aspect a of the process as c, and
therefore will be true (for the informal semantics) if and only if c is. The approach can also fail. It can
fail in 2) if state properties are used in the single agent conceptualisation that have no counterpart in
the example process. It can fail in 3) if in the single agent conceptualisation, aspects of the process are
covered that are left out of consideration in the other conceptualisation. Actually, such aspects exist the
other way around: there are aspects of the process, such as observing the pheromones, that are
covered by the multi-agent conceptualisation, but not by the single agent conceptualisation. Therefore
such a mapping is not possible from right to left in Figure 5 (see also Figure 3 in Section 3, where the
mapping is not bijective either). However, a mapping from left to right (single agent to multi-agent
conceptualisation), is possible. It is shown in Table 3. Note that there S stands for the Superant, and
paw p corresponds to ant a.
Table 3: Mapping between state properties
Single Agent Conceptualisation Multi-Agent Conceptualisation
belief(S, relevance_level(e, i)) pheromones_at(e, i)
has_paw_at_location_from(S, p, l, e) is_at_location_from(a, l, e)
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(S, p, e, l1, l2) is_at_edge_from_to(a, e, l1, l2)
is_carrying_food_with_paw(S, p) is_carrying_food(a)
connected_to_via(l1, l2, e) connected_to_via(l1, l2, e)
neighbours(l, I) neighbours(l, i)
attractive_direction_at(p, l, e) attractive_direction_at(a, l, e)
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, l,
e))
observes(a, is_at_location_from(l, e))
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p, e, l1,
l2))
observes(a, is_at_edge_from_to(e, l1, l2))
--- observes(a, pheromones_at(e, i))
to_be_performed(S,
move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e, l1, l2))
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e,
l1, l2))
to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_location_from
(p, l, e))
to_be_performed(a, go_to_location_from(l,
e))
--- to_be_performed(a,
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l))
to_be_performed(S, pick_up_food_with_paw(p)) to_be_performed(a, pick_up_food)
to_be_performed(S, drop_food_with_paw(p)) to_be_performed(a, drop_food)
 Two Simulation Models
5.1
The two conceptualisations introduced above have been used to create two simulation models for
collective ant behaviour: one from a multi-agent (social) perspective and one from a single agent
(cognitive) perspective. The basic building blocks of the model were dynamic properties in leads to
format, specifying the local mechanisms of the process. Examples of such local dynamic properties (for
the multi-agent case) are the following:
LP5 (Selection of Edge)
"If an ant observes that it is at location l, and there are three edges connected to that location, then the
ant goes to the edge with the highest amount of pheromones."
Formalisation: observes(a, is_at_location_from(l, e0)) and neighbours(l, 3) and
connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e1, i1)) and
connected_to_via(l, l2, e2) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e2, i2)) and e0 ≠ e1 and e0 ≠
e2 and e1 ≠ e2 and i1 > i2 → to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e1, l1))
LP6 (Arrival at Edge)
"If an ant goes to edge e from location l to location l1, then later the ant will be at this edge e."
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e, l, l1)) → is_at_edge_from_to(a, e, l, l1)
LP9 (Dropping of Pheromones)
"If an ant observes that it is at an edge e from a location l to a location l1, then it will drop pheromones
at this edge e."
observes(a, is_at_edge_from_to(e, l, l1)) → to_be_performed(a,
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l))
LP12 (Observation of Pheromones)
"If an ant is at a certain location l, then it will observe the number of pheromones present at all edges
that are connected to location l."
is_at_location_from(a, l, e0) and connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and pheromones_at(e1, i) →
observes(a, pheromones_at(e1, i))
LP13 (Increment of Pheromones)
"If an ant drops pheromones at edge e, and no other ants drop pheromones at this edge, then the new
number of pheromones at e becomes i*decay+incr." Here, i is the old number of pheromones, decay is
the decay factor, and incr is the amount of pheromones dropped.
to_be_performed(a1, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l1)) and ?l2 not to_be_performed(a2,
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l2)) and ?l3 not to_be_performed(a3,
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l3)) and a1 ≠ a2 and a1 ≠ a3 and a2 ≠ a3 and
pheromones_at(e, i) → pheromones_at(e, i*decay+incr)
LP14 (Collecting of Food)
"If an ant observes that it is at location F (the food source), then it will pick up some food."
observes(a, is_at_location_from(F, e)) → to_be_performed(a, pick_up_food)
5.2
To model the example from a single agent perspective, again a number of local dynamic properties are
used. Most, but not all of these local properties have a 1:1 correspondence to those for the multi-agent
case. For example, the properties for the single agent case that correspond to the properties above are
as follows (see the next section for more information about this correspondence):
LP5' (Selection of Edge)
"If S observes that it has a paw p at location A, and there are three edges connected to that location,
then S will move its paw to the edge of which it believes that it has the highest relevance level."
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, l, e0)) and neighbours(l, 3) and
connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and belief(S, relevance_level(e1, i1)) and
connected_to_via(l, l2, e2) and belief(S, relevance_level(e2, i2)) and e0 ≠ e1 and e0 ≠
e2 and e1 ≠ e2 and i1 > i2 → to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e1, l1))
LP6' (Paw Arrival at Edge)
"If S moves its paw p to an edge e from a location l to a location l1, then later this paw will be at this
edge e."
to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e, l, l1)) → has_paw_at_edge_from_to(S,
p, e, l, l1)
LP11' (Increment of Belief)
"If S has exactly one paw at edge e, then the new number of pheromones at e becomes i*decay+incr."
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p1, e, l, l1)) and ?l2 not observes(S,
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p2, e, l, l2)) and ?l3 not observes(S,
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p3, e, l, l3)) and p1 ≠ p2 and p1 ≠ p3 and p2 ≠ p3 and belief(S,
relevance_level(e, i)) → belief(S, relevance_level(e, i*decay+incr))
LP12' (Collecting of Food)
"If S observes that it has a paw p at location F (the food source), then it will pick up some food with that
paw."
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, F, e)) → to_be_performed(S,
pick_up_food_with_paw(p))
The complete sets of local properties used to model the example are shown in Appendix A (multi-agent
case) and Appendix B (single agent case).
5.3
In Bosse et al. (2005), a special software environment is introduced for the simulation of executable
models. Based on an input consisting of dynamic properties in leads to format, it can generate
simulation traces. This environment has been used to generate a number of simulation traces for the
ants case study. An example of (part of) such a trace can be seen in Figure 6. To facilitate
understanding, in this simulation only three ants are involved. Moreover, only some of the relevant
state properties are shown (in particular, those dealing with the movement of ant1, and with the food
delivery of the ants). Time is on the horizontal axis, the state properties are on the vertical axis. A dark
box on top of the line indicates that the property is true during that time period, and a lighter box
below the line indicates that the property is false. This trace was based on the multi-agent simulation
model.
Figure 6. Multi-Agent Simulation Trace
5.4
Figure 7 depicts a similar trace as Figure 6, this time based on the single agent simulation model. Note
that there are several differences between Figure 6 and 7. In the first place, all ants that are treated as
separate agents in Figure 6, are considered as parts of Superant S in Figure 7. For example,
is_at_location_from(ant1, A, E6)) in the multi-agent case corresponds to
has_paw_at_location_from(S, paw1, A, E6)) in the single agent case. Another important difference
is that in the single agent case, there is no explicit observation of pheromones. The reason for this is
that the belief(S, relevance_level(e, i)) states (which are the single agent equivalent for the
pheromones_at(e, i) states in the multi-agent case) are internal states of S, which do not have to be
observed.
5.5
Altogether, the software environment has been used to successfully generate a large number of
simulation traces on the basis of both simulation models. As mentioned earlier, in the examples
depicted only three ants are involved. However, similar experiments have been performed with
populations of 50 and 100 ants. Since the abstract way of modelling used for the simulation is not
computationally expensive, also these simulations can be performed relatively quickly. To be precise,
they took 35 seconds (for 50 ants and 80 time steps), 70 seconds (100 ants, 80 time steps), 100
seconds (50 ants, 200 time steps), and 200 seconds (100 ants, 200 time steps), respectively. A number
of these simulation traces are stored in: http://www.cs.vu.nl/~tbosse/isomorphism/.
Figure 7. Single Agent Simulation Trace
 The Extended Interpretation Mapping
6.1
In Section 3 it was shown how the basic interpretation mapping can be defined as a mapping between
state properties. It was suggested that this mapping can be extended to a mapping between local
dynamic properties in leads to format. Therefore, the following interpretation mapping can be defined:
φ(α → β) = φ(α) → φ(β)
Using this interpretation mapping, combined with the basic mapping of the state ontology elements
described in Section 4, mappings between the dynamic properties of the case study can be found, e.g.:
φ(LP6') = 
φ(to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e, l, l1)) →
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(S, p, e, l, l1)) = 
φ(to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e, l, l1))) →
φ(has_paw_at_edge_from_to(S, p, e, l, l1)) = 
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e, l, l1)) → is_ at_edge_from_to(a, e,
l, l1)) = 
LP6
A mapping between all local dynamic properties (in leads to format) of the case study is given in Table
4. Notice that in some cases a certain dynamic property is mapped to a dynamic property that is not
literally in the multi-agent model, but actually is a combination of two other local properties present in
the model. This shows where the single agent conceptualisation is simpler than the multi-agent
conceptualisation.
Table 4: Mapping between local dynamic properties
Single Agent Conceptualisation Multi-Agent Conceptualisation
LP1' LP1
LP2' LP2
LP3' LP3
LP4' LP4
LP5' LP5 & LP12
LP6' LP6
LP7' LP7
LP8' LP8
LP9' LP10
LP10' LP11
LP11' LP9 & LP13
LP12' LP14
LP13' LP15
LP14' LP16
LP15' LP17
LP16' LP9 & LP18
The mapping shown in Table 4 is a syntactic mapping. However, also the traces generated on the basis
of these properties can be mapped: each trace γ can be mapped onto a trace φ(γ) = γ'. For example, the
trace depicted in Figure 7 can be mapped onto the trace depicted in Figure 6. This shows that the
syntactic mapping between local properties preserves semantics.
6.2
In addition, it is possible to extend the mapping to the wider class of TTL expressions. Recall that TTL
expressions are built on atoms of the form state(γ, t) |= p. By the basic mapping the state property
p can be translated into φ(p), which is assumed to be part of the ontology of one of the agents Ai in the
multi-agent conceptualisation. Moreover, the trace name γ can be mapped onto a trace name φ(γ) = γ'.
Then the extended interpretation mapping for state(γ, t) |= p is defined by:
φ: state(γ, t) |= p = state(γ', t) |= φ(p)
After these atoms have been mapped, TTL expressions as a whole can be mapped in a straightforward
compositional manner:
φ(A & B) = φ(A) & φ(B)
φ(A ? B) = φ(A) ? φ(B)
φ(not A) = not φ(A)
φ(?v A(v)) = ?v' φ(A(v'))
φ(?v A(v)) = ?v' φ(A(v'))
For example, take the following TTL expression, which is a global property for the single agent case of
the ant example:
GP1' Food Discovery
"Eventually, one of the paws of S will be at the food location."
?t,p,l,e [ state(γ, t) |= has_paw_at_location_from(S, p, l, e) & state(γ, t) |=
food_location(l) ]
This expression is mapped as follows:
φ(?t,p,l,e [ state(γ, t) |= has_paw_at_location_from(S, p, l, e) & state(γ, t) |=
food_location(l) ])
= ?t',p',l',e' φ([ state(γ, t') |= has_paw_at_location_from(S, p', l', e') & state(γ,
t') |= food_location(l') ])
= ?t',p',l',e' [φ(state(γ, t') |= has_paw_at_location_from(S, p', l', e')) & φ(state(γ,
t') |= food_location(l')) ] 
= ?t',p',l',e' [ state(γ', t') |= φ(has_paw_at_location_from(S, p', l', e')) & state(γ',
t') |= φ(food_location(l')) ] 
= ?t',p',l',e' [ state(γ', t') |= is_at_location_from(p', l', e') & state(γ', t') |=
food_location(l') ]
Thus, eventually global property GP1' is mapped to the following global property (GP1):
GP1 Food Discovery
"Eventually, one of the ants will be at the food location."
?t,a,l,e [ state(γ, t) |= is_at_location_from(a, l, e) & state(γ, t) |= food_location(l)
]
 Implications for Other Types of Society
7.1
In the previous sections, the notion of a mapping between a multi-agent and single agent
conceptualisation of processes in the world has been illustrated for an example ant society. In this
section, it will be shown that this example is in fact paradigmatic for a whole class of examples,
including examples from human society. The general idea is as follows. Suppose certain processes are
modelled as a multi-agent process, where all agents interact with a given part of the world by observing
it and making changes in it. At any point in time, the state of this part of the world is the result of
contributions of multiple agents. Moreover, this state affects the behaviour of the agents: their
behaviour depends on this part of the world. So, at an abstract level this describes what happens in the
ant society case. Examples of this beyond ant societies are:
the blackboard in a blackboard system,
the collection of past cases that can be considered for jurisprudence by lawyers,
a common database in an organisation that is used to maintain and retrieve common client
information,
a common knowledge repository in the context of knowledge management
a common guidelines document for a certain department.
a common automated advice system for a certain department
7.2
Let us elaborate a bit on the last examples by discussing a case we encountered a few years ago within
a banking organisation. A given department is responsible for advising clients for certain products P,
depending on the background context C of the client. The management of the department notices that
an advice is often depending on the specific advisor, and considers this as less desirable. It wants to
put an effort to show as a department more 'one face' to the outside world of clients. The management
considers the possibility to automate the tasks by means of a decision support system that for each
context more or less forces advisors to one solution. Now, in the context of the current paper, assume
that in such a situation all pieces of advice given by all employees within the department are stored in a
case database DB, in the form of tuples
< C, P, E, t >
with C a context representation, P the advised product for that context, E the employee giving this
advice and t the time when the advice was given. The daily practice then should be as follows. For any
employee, having a client with context C, the employee inspects the database and retrieves all previous
cases for the same context:
CASES(C) = { < P, E, t > | < C, P, E, t > ? DB }
If this set is empty, the employee just gives her own advice and adds this to the database. When this
set is not empty, on the basis of this set it is determined what advice should be given. This can be done
in a number of ways:
take the advice P that has most frequently been given in the past: for context C take P such that 
max { #{ < P', t > | ?E < P', E, t > ? CASES(C) } | P' product } = 
#{ < P, t > | ?E < P, E, t > ? CASES(C) }
take the advice P that has most votes of employees to be used by them: for context C take P such
that
max { #{ E | ?t < P', E, t > ? CASES(C) } | P' product } = 
#{ E | ?t < P, E, t > ? CASES(C) }
take the advice P that has most frequently been given in the past, but apply weight factors
according to a decay rate that values a more recent advice higher than an earlier advice: for
context C and for the current time point t, take P such that
max { Σt' rt-t' #{ < P', t' > | ?E < P', E, t' > ? CASES(C) } | P' product } = 
Σt' rt-t' #{ < P, t' > | ?E < P, E, t' > ? CASES(C) }
Notice that this last approach is, even in structure, quite similar to the ants case. The edges correspond
to the pairs < C, P >, and crossing an edge corresponds to giving such an advice. But also for the other
approaches considered the similarity exists. By accumulating the past actions of the multiple agents, a
structure is created so that the multi-agent system behaves more with one face to the external world of
clients. Therefore, the clients can more easily consider the department as one single agent. The formal
interpretation mapping as described in this paper formalises this situation.
 Discussion
8.1
This paper addresses the question to what extent a process involving multiple agents that shows some
form of collective intelligence can be interpreted as single agent behaviour. The question is answered
by formal analysis. It is shown for an example process how it can be conceptualised and formalised in
two different manners: from a single agent (or cognitive) and from a multi-agent (or social)
perspective. Moreover, it is shown how a basic ontological mapping can be formally defined between
the two formalisations, and how this mapping can be extended to a mapping of dynamic properties.
Thus it is shown how the collective behaviour can be interpreted in a formal manner as single agent
behaviour. For example, the fact that food is taken from the source to the nest can be explained by a
sequence of actions of one agent, based on its beliefs. Although the case study addressed the simple
example of an ant colony, it was shown that the presented interpretation approach can be applied to
human societies as well. For example, the various processes going on within the department of an
organisation can be explained as the behaviour of a single agent.
8.2
Having a mapping as described above allows one to explain collective or social behaviour in terms of
single agent concepts, in the following manner. Behaviour often is explained by considering the basic
underlying causal relations or mechanisms. The mapping (and its formalisation) allows one to replace
an explanation of behaviour in terms of basic mechanisms involving frequent interactions of the
multiple agents (with each other and/or with the external world), by an explanation that leaves out
these interactions and bases itself directly on mental states of the single agent conceptualisation. This
explanation is often simpler, more abstract, better understandable, and perhaps more elegant than the
more complicated explanation based on the interactions. This is made possible by introducing a new
ontology for states involved. For example, considering part of the external world as extended mind
allows one to give another interpretation to external physical processes and states. Physical state
properties such as 'pheromone is present at d' are reconceptualised as, for example, 'it is believed that
d is a relevant path'. Likewise, for the banking example, state properties such as 'advice P has received
the highest number of votes' can be reconceptualised as 'it is believed that P is an appropriate advice'.
8.3
Why would one introduce extra language to refer to the same fact in the world? Given the literature on
reduction, where often it is claimed that mental state properties can be and actually should be replaced
by their physical realisers, at first sight such an opposite move may seem a bit surprising. For example,
Kim (1996, pp. 214-216) claims that ontological simplification is one of the reasons to reduce mental
state properties to physical state properties. In the extended mind case at hand, the converse takes
place; a question is what is the advantage of this ontological complication. A number of arguments in
support of this can be given. Clark and Chalmers (1998) claim that this allows application of other
types of explanation and other methods of scientific investigation:
(…) we allow a more natural explanation of all sorts of actions. (…) in seeing cognition as
extended one is not merely making a terminological decision; it makes a significant
difference to the methodology of scientific investigation. In effect, explanatory methods that
might once have been thought appropriate only for the analysis of "inner" processes are
now being adapted for the study of the outer, and there is promise that our understanding
of cognition will become richer for it. (Clark and Chalmers 1998, Section 3).
In Jonker et al. (2002) it is explained in some detail why in various cases in other areas (such as
Computer Science) such an antireductionist strategy often pays off; some of the discussed advantages
in terms of insight, transparency and genericity are: additional higher-level ontologies can improve
understanding as they may allow simplification of the picture by abstracting from lower-level details;
more insight is gained from a conceptually higher-level perspective; analysis of more complex
processes is possible; finally, the same concepts have a wider scope of application, thus obtaining
unification.
8.4
Also it is claimed by Dennett that the use of a different ontology for the same world facts can be
beneficial. In Dennett (1991b), he puts forward the intentional stance, a perspective that allows one to
describe certain physical phenomena in terms of mental concepts such as desires and intentions, in
order to obtain more understandable explanations:
Predicting that someone will duck if you throw a brick at him is easy from the folk-
psychological stance; it is and will always be intractable if you have to trace the protons
from brick to eyeball, the neurotransmitters from optic nerve to motor nerve, and so forth.
(Dennett 1991b), p. 42.
In this context, the perspective taken in the current paper can be viewed as an extension of the
intentional stance, where mental concepts are ascribed not only to single agents, but also to processes
that can be conceptualised as groups of agents. A difference with Dennett (1991b) is that the only types
of mental states addressed in the current paper are beliefs. Nevertheless, we expect that our approach
can be extended in order to ascribe other mental states (such as desires and intentions) to multi-agent
societies as well. Further research will have to confirm this.
8.5
Given the perspective of the intentional stance, the question might come up whether the behavioural
description of the resulting 'super-agent' will not become just as complex as that of the initial multi-
agent system. Two answers may be given to this question. First, the ants case study addressed in this
paper has shown that there are at least a number of concepts in the multi-agent description that can be
left out in the single agent description. In particular, such concepts are the creation and the observation
of the 'shared extended mental state' (state m2 in Figure 3); also see Table 3 where for some concepts
in the right column there is no counterpart in the left column. Moreover, even if the single agent
description is still rather complex, this does not have to be a problem. Within cognitive science, many
approaches exist to handle complexity of an agent's mental processes by imposing structure on it (see,
e.g.,Fodor 1983). In this view, the collective behaviour of a group of agents may be seen as single
agent behaviour that consists of a number of sub-processes.
8.6
In Section 4.3, it was mentioned that the mapping from multi-agent to single agent conceptualisation
is unidirectional, not bidirectional. The main reason for this was that a number of the 'collective'
concepts did not have an 'individual' counterpart. However, in the literature on philosophy of mind,
several authors show that in some cases it might also be beneficial to explain an individual mental
process as a collective process (see e.g.Dennett 1991a). Thus, it might be useful to explore more
possibilities to obtain a mapping in the opposite direction. In future work, these possibilities will be
investigated in more detail.
8.7
Other future research will further analyse the interpretation mapping in the context of logic: the notion
of an interpretation of one (formal) logical theory T in another logical theory T' has a formal definition
in logic. It is an interesting question whether it can be proven logically that the conditions of this
definition are fulfilled for the mapping defined in this paper. For example, a question is whether it can
be proven that:
T |-- α ? T' |-- φ(α)
for all formulae α, where T is a logical theory of single agent behaviour and T' a theory of multi-agent
behaviour. More specifically, suppose that a global property B is implied by a number of local properties
A1, …, An, according to the following relation:
A1 & … & An ? B
Given this implication, the question to explore would be whether there is a similar relation available
between the mapped properties, i.e., whether the following implication:
φ(A1) & … & φ(An) ? φ(B)
holds as well.
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 Appendix A - The Multi-Agent Simulation Model
LP1 (Initialisation of Pheromones)
"At the start of the simulation, at all locations there are 0 pheromones."
start → pheromones_at(E1, 0.0) and pheromones_at(E2, 0.0) and pheromones_at(E3, 0.0) and
pheromones_at(E4, 0.0) and pheromones_at(E5, 0.0) and pheromones_at(E6, 0.0) and
pheromones_at(E7, 0.0) and pheromones_at(E8, 0.0) and pheromones_at(E9, 0.0) and
pheromones_at(E10, 0.0)
LP2 (Initialisation of Ants)
"At the start of the simulation, all ants are at location A."
start → is_at_location_from(ant1, A, init) and is_at_location_from(ant2, A, init) and
is_at_location_from(ant3, A, init)
LP3 (Initialisation of World)
"These two properties model the ant world. The first property expresses which locations are connected
to each other, and via which edges they are connected. The second property expresses for each
location how many neighbours it has."
start → connected_to_via(A, B, l1) and … and connected_to_via(D, H, l10) start →
neighbours(A, 2) and … and neighbours(H, 3)
LP4 (Initialisation of Attractive Directions)
"This property expresses for each ant and each location, which edge is most attractive for the ant at if it
arrives at that location. This criterion can be used in case an ant arrives at a location where there are
two edges with an equal amount of pheromones."
start → attractive_direction_at(ant1, A, E1) and … and attractive_direction_at(ant3, E,
E5)
LP5 (Selection of Edge)
"These properties model the edge selection mechanism of the ants. For example, the first property
expresses that, when an ant observes that it is at location A, and both edges connected to location A
have the same number of pheromones, then the ant goes to its attractive direction."
observes(a, is_at_location_from(A, e0)) and attractive_direction_at(a, A, e1) and
connected_to_via(A, l1, e1) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e1, i1)) and
connected_to_via(A, l2, e2) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e2, i2)) and e1 ≠ e2 and i1 =
i2 → to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e1, A, l1))
observes(a, is_at_location_from(A, e0)) and connected_to_via(A, l1, e1) and observes(a,
pheromones_at(e1, i1)) and connected_to_via(A, l2, e2) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e2,
i2)) and i1 > i2 → to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e1, A, l1))
observes(a, is_at_location_from(F, e0)) and connected_to_via(F, l1, e1) and observes(a,
pheromones_at(e1, i1)) and connected_to_via(F, l2, e2) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e2,
i2)) and i1 > i2 → to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e1, F, l1))
observes(a, is_at_location_from(l, e0)) and neighbours(l, 2) and connected_to_via(l, l1,
e1) and e0 ≠ e1 and l ≠ A and l ≠ F → to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e1, l, l1))
observes(a, is_at_location_from(l, e0)) and attractive_direction_at(a, l, e1) and
neighbours(l, 3) and connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e1, 0.0))
and connected_to_via(l, l2, e2) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e2, 0.0)) and e0 ≠ e1 and
e0 ≠ e2 and e1 ≠ e2 → to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e1, l, l1))
observes(a, is_at_location_from(l, e0)) and neighbours(l, 3) and connected_to_via(l, l1,
e1) and observes(a, pheromones_at(e1, i1)) and connected_to_via(l, l2, e2) and
observes(a, pheromones_at(e2, i2)) and e0 ≠ e1 and e0 ≠ e2 and e1 ≠ e2 and i1 > i2 →
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e1, l1))
LP6 (Arrival at Edge)
"If an ant goes to an edge e from a location l to a location l1, then later the ant will be at this edge e."
to_be_performed(a, go_to_edge_from_to(e, l, l1)) → is_at_edge_from_to(a, e, l, l1)
LP7 (Observation of Edge)
"If an ant is at a certain edge e, going from a location l to a location l1, then it will observe this."
is_at_edge_from_to(a, e, l, l1) → observes(a, is_at_edge_from_to(e, l, l1))
LP8 (Movement to Location)
"If an ant observes that it is at an edge e from a location l to a location l1, then it will go to location l1."
observes(a, is_at_edge_from_to(e, l, l1)) → to_be_performed(a, go_to_location_from(l1,
e))
LP9 (Dropping of Pheromones)
"If an ant observes that it is at an edge e from a location l to a location l1, then it will drop pheromones
at this edge e."
observes(a, is_at_edge_from_to(e, l, l1)) → to_be_performed(a,
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l))
LP10 (Arrival at Location)
"If an ant goes to a location l from an edge e, then later it will be at this location l."
to_be_performed(a, go_to_location_from(l, e)) → is_at_location_from(a, l, e)
LP11 (Observation of Location)
"If an ant is at a certain location l, then it will observe this."
is_at_location_from(a, l, e) → observes(a, is_at_location_from(l, e))
LP12 (Observation of Pheromones)
"If an ant is at a certain location l, then it will observe the number of pheromones present at all edges
that are connected to location l."
is_at_location_from(a, l, e0) and connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and pheromones_at(e1, i) →
observes(a, pheromones_at(e1, i))
LP13 (Increment of Pheromones)
"These properties model the increment of the number of pheromones at an edge as a result of ants
dropping pheromones. For example, the first property expresses that, if an ant drops pheromones at
edge e, and no other ants drop pheromones at this edge, then the new number of pheromones at e
becomes i*decay+incr. Here, i is the old number of pheromones, decay is the decay factor, and incr is
the amount of pheromones dropped."
to_be_performed(a1, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l1)) and ?l2 not to_be_performed(a2,
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l2)) and ?l3 not to_be_performed(a3,
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l3)) and a1 ≠ a2 and a1 ≠ a3 and a2 ≠ a3 and
pheromones_at(e, i) → pheromones_at(e, i*decay+incr)
to_be_performed(a1, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l1)) and to_be_performed(a2,
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l2)) and ?l3 not to_be_performed(a3,
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l3)) and a1 ≠ a2 and a1 ≠ a3 and a2 ≠ a3 and
pheromones_at(e, i) → pheromones_at(e, i*decay+incr+incr)
to_be_performed(a1, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l1)) and to_be_performed(a2,
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l2)) and to_be_performed(a3,
drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l3)) and a1 ≠ a2 and a1 ≠ a3 and a2 ≠ a3 and
pheromones_at(e, i) → pheromones_at(e, i*decay+incr+incr+incr)
LP14 (Collecting of Food)
"If an ant observes that it is at location F (the food source), then it will pick up some food."
observes(a, is_at_location_from(F, e)) → to_be_performed(a, pick_up_food)
LP15 (Carrying of Food)
"If an ant picks up food, then as a result it will be carrying food."
to_be_performed(a, pick_up_food) → is_carrying_food(a)
LP16 (Dropping of Food)
"If an ant is carrying food, and observes that it is at location A (the nest), then the ant will drop the
food."
observes(a, is_at_location_from(A, e)) and is_carrying_food(a) → to_be_performed(a,
drop_food)
LP17 (Persistence of Food)
"As long as an ant that is carrying food does not drop the food, it will keep on carrying it."
is_carrying_food(a) and not to_be_performed(a, drop_food) → is_carrying_food(a)
LP18 (Decay of Pheromones)
"If the old amount of pheromones at an edge is i, and there is no ant dropping any pheromones at this
edge, then the new amount of pheromones at e will be i*decay."
pheromones_at(e, i) and ?a,l not to_be_performed(a, drop_pheromones_at_edge_from(e, l)) 
→ pheromones_at(e, i*decay)
 Appendix B - The Single Agent Simulation Model
LP1' (Initialisation of Beliefs)
"At the start of the simulation, superant A beliefs that all locations have relevance level 0."
start → belief(S, relevance_level(E1, 0.0)) and belief(S, relevance_level(E2, 0.0)) and
belief(S, relevance_level(E3, 0.0)) and belief(S, relevance_level(E4, 0.0)) and
belief(S, relevance_level(E5, 0.0)) and belief(S, relevance_level(E6, 0.0)) and
belief(S, relevance_level(E7, 0.0)) and belief(S, relevance_level(E8, 0.0)) and
belief(S, relevance_level(E9, 0.0)) and belief(S, relevance_level(E10, 0.0))
LP2' (Initialisation of Paws)
"At the start of the simulation, S has all of its paws at location A."
start → has_paw_at_location_from(S, paw1, A, init) and has_paw_at_location_from(S, paw2,
A, init) and has_paw_at_location_from(S, paw3, A, init)
LP3' (Initialisation of World)
"These two properties model the ant world. The first property expresses which locations are connected
to each other, and via which edges they are connected. The second property expresses for each
location how many neighbours it has."
start → connected_to_via(A, B, l1) and … and connected_to_via(D, H, l10) start →
neighbours(A, 2) and … and neighbours(H, 3)
LP4' (Initialisation of Attractive Directions)
"This property expresses for each paw and each location, which edge is most attractive for the paw at if
it arrives at that location. This criterion can be used in case a paw arrives at a location where there are
two edges with an equal amount of pheromones."
start → attractive_direction_at(paw1, A, E1) and … and attractive_direction_at(paw3, E,
E5)
LP5' (Selection of Edge)
"These properties model the edge selection mechanism of superant S. For example, the first property
expresses that, when S observes that it has a paw p at location A, and S beliefs that the relevance level
of both edges connected to location A is equal, then S will move its paw to its attractive direction."
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, A, e0)) and attractive_direction_at(p, A, e1)
and connected_to_via(A, l1, e1) and belief(S, relevance_level(e1, i1)) and
connected_to_via(A, l2, e2) and belief(S, relevance_level(e2, i2)) and e1 ≠ e2 and i1 =
i2 → to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e1, A, l1))
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, A, e0)) and connected_to_via(A, l1, e1) and
belief(S, relevance_level(e1, i1)) and connected_to_via(A, l2, e2) and belief(S,
relevance_level(e2, i2)) and i1 > i2 → to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p,
e1, A, l1))
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, F, e0)) and connected_to_via(F, l1, e1) and
belief(S, relevance_level(e1, i1)) and connected_to_via(F, l2, e2) and belief(S,
relevance_level(e2, i2)) and i1 > i2 → to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p,
e1, F, l1))
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, l, e0)) and neighbours(l, 2) and
connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and e0 ≠ e1 and l ≠ A and l ≠ F → to_be_performed(S,
move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e1, l, l1))
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, l, e0)) and attractive_direction_at(a, l, e1)
and neighbours(l, 3) and connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and belief(S, relevance_level(e1,
0.0)) and connected_to_via(l, l2, e2) and belief(S, relevance_level(e2, 0.0)) and e0 ≠
e1 and e0 ≠ e2 and e1 ≠ e2 → to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e1, l, l1))
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, l, e0)) and neighbours(l, 3) and
connected_to_via(l, l1, e1) and belief(S, relevance_level(e1, i1)) and
connected_to_via(l, l2, e2) and belief(S, relevance_level(e2, i2)) and e0 ≠ e1 and e0 ≠
e2 and e1 ≠ e2 and i1 > i2 → to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e1, l1))
LP6' (Paw Arrival at Edge)
"If S moves its paw p to an edge e from a location l to a location l1, then later this paw will be at this
edge e."
to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_edge_from_to(p, e, l, l1)) → has_paw_at_edge_from_to(S,
p, e, l, l1)
LP7' (Paw Observation at Edge)
"If S has a paw at a certain edge e, going from a location l to a location l1, then it will observe this."
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(S, p, e, l, l1) → observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p, e, l,
l1))
LP8' (Paw Movement to Location)
"If S observes that it has a paw p at an edge e from a location l to a location l1, then it will move this
paw to location l1."
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p, e, l, l1)) → to_be_performed(S,
move_paw_to_location_from(p, l1, e))
LP9' (Paw Arrival at Location)
"If S moves its paw p to a location l from an edge e, then later this paw will be at this location l."
to_be_performed(S, move_paw_to_location_from(p, l, e)) → has_paw_at_location_from(S, p,
l, e)
LP10' (Paw Observation at Location)
"If S has a paw p at a certain location l, then it will observe this."
has_paw_at_location_from(S, p, l, e) → observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, l, e))
LP11' (Increment of Belief)
"These properties model the increment of S' belief of the relevance level of an edge as a result of the
presence of its paws there. For example, the first property expresses that, if S has exactly one paw at
edge e, then the new number of pheromones at e becomes i*decay+incr. Here, i is the old relevance
level, decay is the decay factor, and incr is the increment value of the belief."
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p1, e, l, l1)) and ?l2 not observes(S,
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p2, e, l, l2)) and ?l3 not observes(S,
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p3, e, l, l3)) and p1 ≠ p2 and p1 ≠ p3 and p2 ≠ p3 and belief(S,
relevance_level(e, i)) → belief(S, relevance_level(e, i*decay+incr))
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p1, e, l, l1)) and observes(S,
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p2, e, l, l2)) and ?l3 not observes(S,
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p3, e, l, l3)) and p1 ≠ p2 and p1 ≠ p3 and p2 ≠ p3 and belief(S,
relevance_level(e, i)) → belief(S, relevance_level(e, i*decay+incr+incr))
observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p1, e, l, l1)) and observes(S,
has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p2, e, l, l2)) and observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p3, e, l,
l3)) and p1 ≠ p2 and p1 ≠ p3 and p2 ≠ p3 and belief(S, relevance_level(e, i)) →
belief(S, relevance_level(e, i*decay+incr+incr+incr))
LP12' (Collecting of Food)
"If S observes that it has a paw p at location F (the food source), then it will pick up some food with that
paw."
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, F, e)) → to_be_performed(S,
pick_up_food_with_paw(p))
LP13' (Carrying of Food)
"If S picks up food with a paw p, then as a result it will be carrying food with that paw."
to_be_performed(S, pick_up_food_with_paw(p)) → is_carrying_food_with_paw(S, p)
LP14' (Dropping of Food)
"If S is carrying food with a paw p, and observes that this paw is at location A (the nest), then S will
drop the food with that paw."
observes(S, has_paw_at_location_from(p, A, e)) and is_carrying_food_with_paw(S, p) →
to_be_performed(S, drop_food_with_paw(p))
LP15' (Persistence of Food)
"As long as a paw that is carrying food does not drop the food, it will keep on carrying it."
is_carrying_food_with_paw(S, p) and not to_be_performed(S, drop_food_with_paw(p)) →
is_carrying_food_with_paw(S, p)
LP16' (Decay of Belief)
"If S beliefs that the relevance level of an edge is i, and S does not observe any of its paws at this edge,
then it will belief that the new relevance level of e is i*decay."
belief(S, relevance_level(e, i)) and ?p,l,l1 not observes(S, has_paw_at_edge_from_to(p,
e, l, l1)) → belief(S, relevance_level(e, i*decay))
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